

comply with the decisions of the conference. They pointed out that the differences between the right and left wings in the European Socialist parties were too deep, and the majority parties too heavily committed to the national policies of their respective governments, to accept in advance decisions taken by so unpredictable a forum as an international Socialist conference. They agreed to commit themselves only if the decisions of the conference were outlined in advance, in accordance with their concept of a just peace, and if only details were left to further negotiations. With this reservation, it was agreed that the conference would meet in Stockholm.

Since there was little interest in this idea abroad, the Soviet decided to send a delegation to tour the Allied countries to try to get support for the Soviet plan among the workers. The delegation seemed to be rather successful at the beginning. Though it did not kindle the imagination of the masses, it organized a few meetings, held conferences with national leaders, and published half a dozen articles in the labor press. In Russia, however, the campaign for the Stockholm conference made little progress. People close to the Executive Committee manifested little interest in it and the general press ignored it.

Indeed, the Soviet was much less absorbed in Socialist diplomacy than in such matters as fraternization on the front lines. The last problem overshadowed all other issues in the peace-and-war campaign in the spring of 1917.

CONDITIONS IN THE ARMY

The German High Command kept from one third to half of all its divisions on the Russian front, but these were largely incomplete and tired divisions in need of rest and reorganization. Interested in maintaining a lull on this front, the Germans did not harass our troops. As in all wars everywhere in the world, the lull was welcomed by the troops in our trenches, thoroughly tired after the long series of defeats that preceded the revolution. But in accepting the *de facto* truce offered to her by the enemy, Russia would actually be supporting Germany against the Allies. The policy of our High Command, therefore, was to exercise sufficient pressure on the enemy lines and to keep the army sufficiently strong to represent a threat to the enemy. The Petrograd Soviet and the army organizations decided to support this policy.

This was a difficult decision. At the outbreak of the revolution, the men at the front distrusted their officers, and the officers distrusted their men. But the revolution had called into being the new factor in the army—the soldiers' committees. They were an institution completely strange to the old-regime army, and the officers, especially